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Demographic projections of age structure provide the best information available on long-term
human resources and demand. In current data fairly robust correlations with GDP and GDP
growth have been discovered. In this paper we use these two facts and study the forecasting
properties of demographically based models. Extending the forecasts to 2050 suggests that due to
fertility decreases poor countries of today will start to catch up with developed economies in
which the growth process will stagnate due to the growth of the retired population.
Forecasting global growth by age structure
projections
Will the current income gaps between the developed and the developing world persist or will we
have a long-run convergence between different parts of the world? This question has been
thorougly researched in cross-country convergence studies over the last two decades where a
rather pessimistic view has emerged. Given current structures the indication is that convergence
only takes place within certain clubs of countries like the OECD, while the poorest part of the
world is actually diverging relative to the developed countries. Of course, the conclusion is not
that the poverty of some countries is ordained by destiny, but rather that drastic internal structural
change combined with international aid and pressures is needed in order to bring an end to the
extreme poverty in the world. Based on rather fragile empirical evidence factors such as
technological change, human capital, free market institutions and strict budgetary discipline, just
to mention a few, have been more or less emphasised in the debate. Long-term projections of
income have been hard to achieve from these hypotheses, since the implied driving forces are
hard to measure and even harder to project into the future.
This paper draws on another fundamental force driving growth: demographic change (Malmberg
1994; Kelley and Schmidt 1995; Bloom and Williamson 1997; Higgins and Williamson 1997;Lindh and Malmberg 1999). This is a variable that is relatively easy to measure, and can be
projected into the future with at least reasonably low uncertainty for long periods of time. Our
focus on demography doesn’t mean that the importance of other factors is downplayed. However,
access to population projections makes forecasting based on demographic factors more straight
forward then, for example, forecasting based on the effects of institutional change. The focus in
this paper is on evaluating the forecasting performance of demographically based models. We
estimate demographically based models of income as a function of age structure, urbanization
and life expectancy, and test their statistical properties both in and out of sample. Finally we use
UN projections of age structure to derive forecasts of global income levels and the evolution up
to 2050.
Our conclusion is that such forecasts behave reasonably well in predicting income and in the long
term shows promise to be a much safer method than any available alternative method. The long-
run forecasts also indicate that, as a consequence of the demographic age transition, primarily
decreasing shares of children and increasing longevity, developing countries (with the possible
exception of AIDS inflicted countries in sub-Saharan Africa) will tend to grow faster and thus
start converging to the income levels of the developed world.
Although the contribution of this paper is intended to be in forecasting it is of some importance to
make clear that the use of age structure variables for income forecasting does have an extensive
theoretical and empirical foundation, so the first section of the paper is devoted to an account of
the facts and theories behind the demographic age transition and its impact on the economy.
Section 2 presents the estimated model and the forecast. The concluding section argues that our
forecasts inspire confidence in a rather bright global future.
1. Starting point: The demographic transition
What we now know as the demographic transition was discovered in the second quarter of the
20th century by demographers observing the variation of death rates and birth rates across
countries and over time. The finding was that
…in the Western cultural area there has been a general process of change from the relative
population stability at high levels of mortality and fertility to the slowing growth or actual decline
of population numbers at low levels of mortality and fertility which characterized the interwar
period. The initial effect was a decrease in mortality, leaving largely intact the large familypattern. For reasons that are not entirely clear a small family pattern became not only an ideal but
a goal realized by increasing proportions of the population. Birth rates fell rapidly, at first in
cities, later in the surrounding rural areas. (Taeuber 1945)
The prerequisite for this observation was increasing efforts to assemble demographic data from
the 19th century and onwards that had made available time-series stretching over multiple
decades or longer. Researchers in the inter-war era, thus, could base their analysis of population
trends on a comparatively rich empirical material. However, the concept of demographic
transition was not only used as a name for an empirical pattern. Instead the researchers who
introduced the term saw these trends in mortality and fertility as the expression of an underlying
social transformation process. Moreover, their conclusion from observing similar demographic
trends in different countries was that the process of demographic transition would not be
restricted to Europe but would spread also to other parts of the world. In fact, Irene B. Taeuber's
original formulation of the transition idea appears in a paper that analyses the population
development of Southern and Eastern Asia.
In 1945 the idea that the world would witness demographic transitions throughout Asia, Africa
and America was basically a scientific hypothesis yet to be verified or falsified. The key
assumption behind this hypothesis was essentially a belief that the technologies giving rise to
lower mortality would continue to spread to those parts of the world that still suffered from high
mortality levels. Developments after 1945 have demonstrated that this assumption was well-
founded, although even proponents of the transition hypothesis soon became surprised by the
amazing decline of mortality in underdeveloped areas (Kingsley Davis, 1956).
Today, almost 60 years later we can conclude that the demographic transition hypothesis has
proved to be correct. First, the mortality decline observed in the Western world and in parts of
Asia before 1945 has indeed spread to practically all parts of the world. Before 1945 the life
expectancy at birth in many non-Western populations were appreciably below 40 years. In India
1941-50 and also in Mauritius 1942-46, for example, the expectation of life at birth has been
estimated to be only 32 years (Stolnitz 1965). Similarly, the Bantu population of South Africa
had an estimated life expectancy at birth of 33.6 years in 1936-46 (Walle and Page 1969). Life
expectancy in China was lower still: data on the Chinese farmer population in 1929-31 indicate
values of 28.1 years in North China and 24.2 years in South China (Barclay, Coale et al. 1976). Inother parts of the world the picture was somewhat brighter with male life expectancy at birth at
40.9 years in Chile (1940), 41.1 years in Taiwan (1936-41), 42.1 years in Egypt (1937)
(Toppozada 1968), 44.5 years in Trinidad and Tobago (1930-32), 45.1 years in Puerto Rico
(1939-41), 45.8 years in Venezuela (1942-42), and 46.9 years in Japan (1935-36) (Stolnitz 1965).
After the Second World War life expectancy in these countries has risen dramatically. The most
impressive gains have been made in China. In 1999 the World Bank estimated a life expectancy
at birth of 70 years. That is a gain of 44 years compared with the life expectancy for the Chinese
farmer population around 1930. Japan, Taiwan and Chile have gains in life expectancy around 35
year. The gains in India, Puerto Rico, and Trinidad Tobago are around 30 years whereas Egypt
and Venezuela have gained about 25 years. Also in South Africa there was a 23 years gain in life-
expectancy up to 1980 but nine years of this gain has been lost between 1980 and 1999 primarily
because of AIDS related deaths. Of the large world regions (East Asia & Pacific, Europe &
Central Asia, Latin America & Caribbean, Middle East & North Africa, South Asia, and Sub-
Saharan Africa) only Sub-Saharan Africa now, despite a substantial increase, has a life-
expectancy at birth below 50 years. In the rest of the world life expectancy is above 60 years.
Also the second prediction of the demographic transition hypothesis---that birth rates for an
extended period will stay high when the death rates have begun to decline---has proved correct.
Using UN data (World population prospects---the 2000 revision) this process can be most easily
traced in African countries like Kenya, Ethiopia and Nigeria where falling death rates and
relatively stable birth rates lead to accelerated population growth during the 1950s, 1960s, and
1970s. However, the starting point of the UN data is the 1950-54 period which means that this
data set doesn't capture the dramatic decline in death rates that followed in the first few years
after 1945. According to a study by Kingsley Davis, based on 18 underdeveloped areas, not
chosen because they had unusual declines in mortality but because they were representative of
different areas and had fairly constant boundaries and a relatively continuous series of registered
death statistics the total decline in the crude death rate between 1935 and the 1950-54 period can
be estimated to 58%, with the largest part of the decline coming after 1945. This large decline up
to the 1950-54 period implies that the UN data gives us a picture of what is happening to the
population directly after a sharp mortality reduction. If Kingsley Davis' estimate is correct---and
assuming stable birth rates--- the population growth rate in the less developed countries (UN,
2001 definition) would have accelerated from 0.3% annually in 1935 to 2.1% in 1950-54. Thisgrowth rate was the result of a crude birth rate of 44.6 and a crude death rate coming down from
41.2 to 24.1. Declining death rates, thus, led to accelerated population growth exactly as the
Princeton demographers had predicted.
Towards the end of the 1960s the death rate of the less developed countries had declined a further
9 points but the birth rate had only declined by half us much. Population growth in the less
developed countries, thus, had accelerated further and now stood at 2.5% annually. The end of
the 1960s, then, was a time when the transition hypothesis did not seem to be correct. Had not the
hypothesis assumed that declining death rates would be followed by lower birth rates? And, what
would happen if birth rates remained high? This, thus, was also a good time for dooms-day
predictions concerning the future of the earth and its population (Ehrlich 1968; Ehrlich and
Ehrlich 1970). Not everyone lost their nerves, though. The UN forecasters continued to base their
projections on the assumption of a slow but continuing fertility decline that would bring down the
population growth rate. And---as it turned out---the UN forecasters were right. Between 1965-69
and 1970-74 there came an important shift in the population trend as growth rates in Eastern Asia
and South-Eastern Asia started to decline. This had happened in Korea and in Latin America
already some years earlier but it was with the Asian turn-around that the shifting trend became
globally significant. Later in the 1970s population growth rates started to decline in Southern
Africa and in the mid 1980s, population growth began to slow also in North Africa, Western and
South Central Asia. In the early 1990s, it happened in Western Africa and in Eastern Africa too,
although in the latter case this slowdown was partly due to an increase in the death rates. And at
the end of the 1990s, Middle Africa also seems to have passed its peak in the population growth
rate.
A more detailed view of factors behind the downward trend in population growth comes from a
look at how the total fertility rates have developed after 1950. In Figure 1 , the most important
patterns of fertility change in the world between 1950 and 2000 are outlined. Countries with a
similar pattern of fertility change have been grouped together and for each year the mean fertility
rate in each group has been calculated. Figure 1  shows clearly that fertility rates differ much
across the world and that there are different patterns of fertility change. However, there are also
strong common trends. In all groups, except two, fertility has gone down since 1950 although at
different rates.Only two groups have a record of no significant decline in mortality. In these groups we find a
number of very poor countries many of which have experienced strong social disruption:
Afghanistan, Angola, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Ethiopia, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Somalia,
Uganda, and Yemen all belong to the group where the total fertility rate still is close to 7 children
per woman. Also for Bhutan, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea , Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Lao People's
Democratic Republic, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, and Pakistan there has been very little
change in the total fertility rate, almost constant around 6 children per woman.
Another group for which the fertility rate in 1995-1999 still is very high, around 5.4, is made up
by Benin, Comoros, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Iraq, Jordan,
Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Maldives, Nigeria, the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Oman,
Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Solomon Islands, Sudan, Swaziland, the Syrian Arab Republic,
Togo, the United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. For this group starting with a
TFR of 7 in 1950, there has, however, been an appreciable reduction in the fertility rate,
especially since 1980. A trend which, if we are to judge from the development of other groups,
can be expected to continue.
The group consisting of Algeria, Bangladesh, Belize, Bolivia, Botswana, Cape Verde, Egypt,
Honduras, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Mongolia, Morocco, Nicaragua, Philippines, Qatar, Samoa,
Tajikistan, the United Arab Emirates, Vanuatu, and Western Sahara in 1950 also had an average
TFR of 7 but by the end of the 1990s the average rate had been reduced to 3.8, a very
considerable reduction
The three groups Bahrain, Brunei Darussalam, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Fiji, India, Kuwait, Malaysia, Mexico, Myanmar, Peru, Saint Lucia, South
Africa, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, and Viet Nam starting at  a TFR
of 6.5, followed by Albania, Brazil, French Polynesia, Guyana, Indonesia, Lebanon, Panama,
Suriname, and Thailand starting at TFR at 6.0, and finally Azerbaijan, Chile, China, Guadeloupe,
Martinique, Mauritius, the Republic of Korea, Réunion, Sri Lanka, Trinidad and Tobago also
starting at a TFR of 6.0 have essentially tracked one another with respect to the fertility decline
and arrived at mean TFR rates of 3.0, 2.5, and 1.9 respectively in the late 1990s.
In the group Armenia, Bahamas, Barbados, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Hong Kong, Macao, Cuba,Ireland, Israel, Kazakhstan, the Netherlands Antilles, Puerto Rico, and Singapore with a mean
TFR in 1950 of about 4.6 has fallen to 1.9. The last two groups, with 1950 TFRs of 3.5 and 2.5
consists largely of developed countries that already in the beginning of the period had completed
the classical fertility transition.
What we can see in Figure 1, then, is a quite impressive corroboration of the demographic
transition hypothesis. To be sure, some countries have yet to enter the phase of fertility decline
and others have a long way to go before they reach replacement fertility, that is, a level of TFR
slightly above 2 that in the long run keeps a population constant. But the patterns of fertility
change during the last fifty year strongly suggests that a continuing fertility decline in today's
high fertility countries is to be expected.
The Princeton hypothesis of a demographic transition affecting countries all over the world, thus,
has turned out to be one of the most successful predictions made by social scientists in the 20th
century.
The age transition
In the 1990s different scholars have pointed out that population growth will not be evenly
distributed across the different age groups during the demographic transition (Chesnais 1990;
Chesnais 1992). On the contrary, as the demographic transition unfolds the growth rate of
different age groups will follow an uneven pattern (Malmberg and Sommestad 2000). In some
periods during the transition population growth will be concentrated to the youngest part of the
population. In other periods the young adult, middle aged, or old age population segments are
increasing most rapidly. This implies that population growth will give coherent effects on per
capita income only if it is correct that the economic effects of population growth are the same
irrespective of whether it is children, young adults, middle aged adults, or old age adults that are
increasing in numbers (Bloom, Canning et al. 2003). Even as a scientific simplification that
seems to be a rather far fetched hypothesis.
How does age structure change during a demographic transition?
This question can be answered both empirically and through the use of demographic models. As
it turns out, both methods give very similar results, at least over long periods with moderate
levels of immigration and emigration. The typical pattern of a mortality decline followed---after a
lag---by declining fertility will generate a very distinct pattern of age structure change. This
pattern can be observed in most countries affected by a demographic transition. One way tosummarize is to distinguish four different phases of population growth during the demographic
transition:
The first phase following the onset of mortality decline is characterized by an increase in the
number of children. The primary reason for this is that in high mortality regimes it is among
newborns, infants and young children that the death toll is especially high. So when mortality
comes down it is to a large extent the lives of the very youngest that are spared. In time, this
increase in the number of children will also increase the young adult fertile population and---as
long as fertility rates are unchanged---this will, by inducing more births, further accelerate the
increase in the number of children. This first child-rich phase of what can be called the age
transition will continue as long as the fertility rate remains high. The fertility decline eventually
slow down the increase of the child population.
The second phase is characterized by an expansion of the young adult population. The
mechanism behind this expansion is simply that with declining mortality, and later an increase in
the number of births, the number of surviving individuals in each cohort will increase. As these
ever larger cohorts reach adult ages the young adult population will start to expand. Because it
takes time for newborns to reach adult age the young adult phase will start 15-20 years later than
the child-rich phase and it will continue 15-20 years after the expansion of the child population
has stopped.
The third phase is characterized by an expansion of the middle aged population. This phase starts
when the cohorts enlarged by mortality decline and increases in the number of births reach the
middle ages. Depending on how one defines ``middle age'' this expansion is initiated 20-30 years
after the young adult phase starts. It thus takes four to five decades or more before the mortality
decline of a demographic transition produces an appreciable increase in the number of middle
aged.
The fourth phase, finally, is reached when the enlarged cohorts reach retirement and is
characterized by an expansion of the old age population. Often, this expansion starts after the
fertility rates have dropped to a low level and this means that the old age phase, and also at least
part of the middle age phase, lies outside the time span that we normally consider when we talk
about the demographic transition. In Sweden, for example, the classic transition was complete in
the 1930s when the total fertility rate had come down to, or even below, the replacement level.The middle age phase of the age transition, however did not end until about 1970 and the old age
phase continued for another two decades.
Two things should be noted about the age transition. First, as pointed out above, the age transition
as a phenomenon extends for a considerably longer period than the classical transition. This
implies that the demographic transition, because of population momentum, will have social and
economic effects also when there are no longer any current changes in the vital rates. Second, it is
important to remember that, to some extent, the phases of the age transition will overlap.
Depending on for how long later cohorts keep getting larger than earlier cohorts this time of
overlap may be short or long.
The fact that countries with large differences in terms of historical traditions, climate, and
geography have gone through demographic transitions that in terms of changing mortality and
birth rates have been similar is certainly a challenge to social science. In this study---where the
purpose is not to explain why demographic transitions have occurred but to utilize the effect the
transitions have on income growth---the existence of numerous instances of demographic
transitions in very different contexts is, however, a great advantage creating variation and
correlations that can be exploited to forecast income.
The global geography of age transitions
How then, has the age transition affected the population structure in different parts of the world.
One way to illustrate this is to use the UN data that gives both an account of estimated age
structures for the 1959-2000 period and population structure forecasts for the 2000-2050 period
(for details see Malmberg & Sommestad, 2000b). Given that the UN provides data for more than
200 different regions and 17 to 20 five year age groups for a 100 years period implies that it can
be hard to get a grip on how the age structure is changing. However, by the use of cluster analysis
it is possible to extract a smaller number of characteristic age structures that will capture the
typical age distributions that different population will demonstrate as they go through the age
transition, see Figure 2a och 2b.
These typical age structures can be associated with different phases of the age transition. Figure 3
shows, using these typical age patterns, how age structure in the world will change in the next 50
years according to the UN forecast. The remarkable thing is that there will be very drastic
changes in the age structure during the next 50 years, especially in regions with a large share ofdeveloping countries.
The question now is if these projected changes in the age structure can be used to forecast future
levels of per capita income? One indication of this possibility is given in Figure 4 that shows the
per capita income level in countries assigned to the different age structure types of the cluster
analysis. Old countries are rich countries whereas young countries are poor countries.
The UN predicts that many of the young countries will become old countries.Does this imply that
they also will become rich? If we believe that the income patterns in Figure 4  will remain true
also in the next 50 years then Figure 3 , showing how regions of the world passes from one type
of age pattern to another, also gives an indication of how per capita incomes will change.
From recent empirical growth literature we also know that there is a robust association between
age structure and economic growth, where dependent groups tend to depress growth and the
working age groups tend to enhance it. At present it is not clear which mechanisms these
associations rely on. Obviously there should be a direct labor supply effect making the economy
grow faster as the working age groups increase the fastest, but just as obviously the home bias in
the relation between domestic saving and investment, should make capital accumulation easier
when a large part of the population are in the middle age phase. There are indirect effects through
the public sector finances since revenue and public consumption and transfers are asymmetrically
distributed with respect to age. There are also more long-run mechanisms where for example
increasing longevity provides incentives both for retirement saving and increased human capital
accumulation. Several other factors having to do with age-specific demand and income patterns
could also be invoked as parts of the explanation. Here we do not go further into this discussion.
but are satisfied that there are good solid reasons why we should expect a correlation of GDP
growth and age structure.
2. Using demographic transition theory to forecast
global income growth
The model we will estimate three demographic factors that influence economic development:
Mortality, age structure and urban structure. Each of these factors are closely connected to the
demographic transition. Declining mortality is what triggers the demographic transition. Age
structure change is, as argued above, a process that necessarily accompanies the transition.Urbanization, finally is a spatial redistribution of the population that also has characterized all
countries undergoing demographic transition. All these three factors have also been focused in
the discussion of the last decade concerning the determinants of national economic growth.
Our aim is to analyze if we in historic data can find such stable correlations between economic
development, mortality, age structure and urban structure that allow us to forecast future trends in
income growth.
The model we have chosen to estimate deviates from the basic model in equation  in the
following ways:
1)  Log per capita income is assumed to be a quadratic function of life expectancy at birth. The
relation between development and life expectancy is non-linear. Although the best fit seems
to be a kinked linear relation to life expectancy this is hard to use for forecasting but a
quadratic function should capture at least some of the same features.
2)  Log per capita income is assumed to be positively influenced by a well-developed urban
system as measured by the population size of the largest city (in logs). However, urbanization
effects are allowed to differ between countries at different levels of mortality. The positive
effect of urban size on economic development has long been a staple of regional development
theory. During the 1990s it has also received new interest from leading economists. To
measure urbanization by the size of the largest city is, however, to our knowledge a new
approach, as well as the idea that city system effects can differ according to the level of
mortality.
3)  Log per capita income is influenced by shifts in the age structure of the population. The
relations between age structure and per capita income are allowed to change at different
levels of mortality. Depending on whether developed or developing countries have been
focused there has been some differences in what age groups that seem to be the most
important for influencing economic development. Moreover, theoretical research on the effect
of life expectancy on the optimal length of education, fertility, saving and retirement decision
indicate that the economic life cycle should change in response to changing mortality. This
implies that it can be misleading to assume that the profile of age structure effects on per
capita income will be the same in countries at different mortality levels. Rather we would
expect the pattern to shift with life expectancy. To capture this our specification allows for aninteraction between age effects and a quadratic function of life expectancy.
4)  Recent observations have been given a larger weight than early observations. Through the
use of this weighting procedure the estimate of the country specific intercept will be more
strongly influenced by conditions in the later part of the estimation period. Given that we
have structural change in the relations this is important when the purpose is forecasting.
Results
Table 1 presents the results obtained by estimating the model presented above. All the parameters
refer to the same model. Column 1 gives the results for the direct effects. Column 2 gives the
parameter estimates obtained for interactions with life expectancy at birth. Column 3 gives the
results from interactions with life expectancy squared. Of the 20 parameter estimates presented in
the table 1 all except 5 are significantly different from zero at the 5 %-level.
The estimates show that life expectancy, as expected, is directly correlated with per capita
income. However, the estimates also confirm the hypothesis that life expectancy modifies the
effect of demographic structure. Thus, a well developed urban system has a positive effect on per
capita income, but only when life expectancy rises above 62 years. Life expectancy also modifies
the effects of age structure.
The estimates show that, as expected, there is a strong negative effect on per capita income from
high levels of child dependency. The strongest negative effect of child dependency is found when
life expectancy is around 60 years. With further increases in life expectancy the effect becomes
somewhat weaker but it is still negative when life expectancy has reached 75 years.
The effect of young adults is much less negative. This implies that per capita income will
improve when child dependency declines and the share of young adults increases. However, as
life expectancy increases above 70 years the effect of the young adult share becomes negative.
This might indicate that increasing length of education in low mortality populations reduces the
income boosting effect of young adults.
A surprising result is that in high and medium mortality populations (life expectancy < 65 years)
there is an effect on per capita income of young middle-aged adults (30-49 years) almost as
negative as the effect of children. When life-expectancy increases above 70 years, however, a
high share of people aged 30-49 years becomes a strong booster of per capita income. A negative
effect of prime aged adults seems counter-intuitive but there are, at least, two possible substantiveexplanations. One is that adults aged 30-49 are the primary care takers of dependent children.
Since most high and medium mortality populations still have high fertility rates this age group,
therefore, may face severe time restrictions with respect to their participation in market activities.
A second possibility is given by the fact that a high share of young middle aged adults in
populations with moderate and low life expectancy is associated with increased risk for severe
disturbances to the social order like revolts, riots and civil war. It remains far from clear what lies
behind this association but the existence of such a pattern would explain why a high share of
people aged 30-49 does not give rise to the expected positive effects on per capita income.
However, we cannot at this point ignore the possibility that it is simply a statistical artefact due to
the high negative correlation between this group and the age share of children.
The 50-64 group follows a similar but less pronounced pattern. A weak negative effect when E0
is around 60 turns positive when life expectancy increases above 75 years.
For the old age share the effect is negative but the estimated parameters are small. To some
extent this reflects the use of log shares. In populations with few old age people small percentage
point increases in the old age share translates into large increases in the log share.
One way to summarize these findings is to note that at low and medium levels of life expectancy
the age effects on per capita income are dominated by the balance between children and young
adults. Child-rich populations tend to be poor whereas countries with declining child dependency
and an expanding young adult population enjoy rising per capita income. At higher levels of life
expectancy it is instead a high share of middle age adults (30-49 and 50-64 years old) that ensure
good economic prospects. The hypothesis that changing life expectancy can alter the profile of
age structure effects has, thus, been corroborated.Table 1 does not give the estimated country effects. These are displayed in Figure 5 which shows
that a substantial part of the variation in per capita income is captured by the country effects.
These strong country effects underscore that demography is not the only factor that determines
per capita income. However, the success of demographic transition theory gives us strong reasons
to believe that population forecast based on the transition hypothesis are relatively reliable.
Therefore, a forecast of future changes in per capita income based on the model presented here
can provide a picture of possible global trends that are consistent with historical correlations
between demographic and economic change.
 Performing an out-of-sample experiment by estimating the model on data up to 1990 and then
comparing forecasts to actual outcomes we get the results in Table 2. What we can observe here
is that there is a slow increase of errors with the horizon. Judging from the mean errors we have
not much problem with systematic bias in the forecasts.
Forecasts
Below the 2000-2050 forecasts per capita income for 13 different countries are presented. These
forecasts are all based on the medium variant of World Population Prospects: The 2000 Revision.
The fertility assumptions applied by the Population Division in the medium variant are
reproduced in appendix A. According to the Population Division mortality in the medium version
is projected on the basis of the models of change of life expectancy produced by the United
Nations. In countries highly affected by the HIV/AIDS epidemic, estimates of the impact of the
disease are made explicitly through assumptions about the future course of the epidemic, that is,
by projecting the yearly incidence of HIV infection.
The Population Division provides predicted values for the variable "population in the largest city"
only up to 2015. Because of this the forecast we present below is based on a separate projection.
This projection is based on an interpolation of observed country-specific growth rates for the
population in the largest city. This observed growth rate has been adjusted for effects on the
growth rate from shifts in the growth rate of the 0-14 age group, the 50-64 age group and the
share of the 0-14 age group as well as allowing for a time-trend in the growth rates for the
population of the largest city.One characteristic of the forecasts is that they not are based on the assumption of a given rate of
technological change. One reason for this is that the 1960-1998 period didn’t demonstrate a clear
trend across all countries. We have, therefore, chosen to present forecasts without the addition of
a technology trend.
These forecasts have been produced for 82 countries. Countries for which no forecast have been
made are either not included in our original sample or do not have values available for the size of
their largest city in UN's Urbanization prospects.
The parameter values used in the forecast are those that are presented in Table 1 and Figure 5.
One important modification, however, is that in the forecast the maximum value of life
expectancy has been fixed to 76 years. The motivation for this is that in the sample used for
estimating the model only a few countries have experienced life expectancies above 76 years for
an extended period. As a consequence, there is no information about how increased life
expectancies beyond 76 years will affect economic growth. In the forecast we present, this lack of
knowledge is represented by an assumption that countries with a life expectancy above 76 years
will behave in a way similar to countries that have only a life expectancy of 76 years.
The general pattern is that developed countries will tend to stagnate while developing countries
will tend to take off on a growth path is confirmed. The exceptions are mainly in Sub-Saharan
Africa and due to the AIDS epidemic and continuing high fertility in the UN forecast.
3. Conclusion: A better world
Using demographic projections we evaluate forecasting models for GDP per capita based on
demographic information. The result is that the currently aging developed countries will
experience a stagnating or even negative growth trend in income. Most developing countries will,
however, experience accelerating growth and converge towards the income levels of the
developed world. The main exceptions to this are to be found in sub-Saharan Africa where the
impact of AIDS on the age distribution is expected to postpone any growth take-off.
Thus we expect that demographic change and the demographic gift following from decreased
fertility rates will substantially decrease the share of people living in extreme poverty in the
world. The negative aging effects on developed countries do not imply any catastrophic decrease
of living standards. The futures scenario that appears from this forecasting exercise is thus a
rather bright one, where economic prosperity and equality increases and fewer people will live inextreme poverty. In the absence of contrary evidence we therefore find that demographic
projections indicate a better world within the next half century.References
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ln maxpop -0,0004 0,0095 .
(-0,02) (10,62)
lna014 -2,5880 0,0392 0,0058
(-6,75) (0,88) (3,45)
lna1529 0,2121 0,0079 -0,0025
(0,83) (0,29) (-2,34)
lna3049 -1,4792 0,1012 0,0041
(-7,25) (4,78) (4,39)
lna5064 -0,6598 0,0211 0,0025
(-5,03) (2,28) (4,54)






Table 1 Effects of life expectancy, urban structure and demographic structure on log per capita
income.Mean error Mean absolute error Root mean square error
1991 -0.033 0.148 0.194
1992 -0.041 0.162 0.208
1993 -0.050 0.180 0.238
1994 -0.050 0.195 0.265
1995 -0.033 0.214 0.282
1996 -0.022 0.226 0.302
1997 -0.005 0.231 0.314
1998 0.009 0.211 0.272
Table 2: Forecast errors for the model estimated at the sample 1950-1990. Average over the










1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Initial TFR 7.0, No declin
Initial TFR 6.0, no declin







Initial TFR 2.5Figure 2a Different age structures in the world 1950-2050



















































Age groupFigure 3 Changes in global age structure 2000-2050.
Changes in global age structure
Region 2000 2015 2030 2050
East Africa Childrich Childrich Family age Modernization 
Central Africa Childrich Childrich Family age Modernization 
West Africa Childrich Family age Family age Modernization 
Southern Africa Family age Family age Modernization  Middle-age 
West Asia Family age Modernization  Middle-age Middle-age 
Central America Family age Modernization  Middle-age Maturity 
North Africa Family age Modernization  Middle-age Maturity 
South Asia Family age Modernization  Middle-age Maturity 
Southeast Asia Family age Modernization  Middle-age Maturity 
South America Modernization Modernization  Middle-age Maturity 
Caribbean Modernization  Middle-age Maturity  Maturity 
East Asia Modernization  Middle-age Maturity  Advanced  aging 
Oceania Middle-age Middle-age  Maturity  Maturity 
Eastern Europe Middle-age Maturity  Maturity  Advanced  aging 
North America Middle-age Maturity  Maturity  Advanced  aging 
Western Europe Middle-age  Maturity  Advanced aging  Advanced aging 
Northern Europe Maturity  Maturity  Advanced aging  Advanced aging 
Southern Europe Maturity  Maturity  Advanced aging  Advanced aging Figure 4 Per capita income 1990 by type of age structure
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